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Jihad’s Relationship to Resistance 
Jay Heidekat 
 
Within Islamic belief, the call to jihad can be extrapolated to mean 
many things; however, conceptual common ground can be found in the 
classification of jihad as a struggle to improve one’s society or self. Within 
marginalized social groups that are seeking to better their situation, this 
struggle can manifest itself in the form of violent resistance or civil 
disobedience. Resistance movements, like Hezbollah, are interested in 
influencing their own government or ejecting the physical or indirect presence 
of what the movement perceives to be imperialist hegemony. Depending on 
the context from which the notion of jihad is propagated, it may require 
something as simple as boycotting American goods. On the other hand, jihad 
can be implemented to legitimate the use of violent resistance or even to 
glorify and encourage suicide bombers—who are remembered as martyrs and 
used to fuel the cause. To answer the questions of how resistance leaders 
within Hezbollah justify these sometimes-violent actions, we must examine the 
influential rhetoric of the Shiite cleric Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. 
 Fadlallah clearly links the concept of jihad to resistance and describes 
it as a most righteous and necessary struggle. In interviews he does not 
attempt to separate the often-conflicting notions of nationalism and religion or 
violence and virtue. In true dynamic, Islamist fashion, Fadlallah explains: 
“Concerning violence, jihad in Islam is a defensive movement and a deterrent. 
When God spoke to us about war, He said we should fight on behalf of the 
weak, ‘And fight them on until there is no more persecution’ [Al-Baqara: 193]. 
Fight for the helpless, fight those who fight you.”
1
 In this statement, Fadlallah 
attempts to describe, in broad terms, when violence should be used. The 
important message is that jihad must be viewed as a defensive measure with a 
religious backing. There is, however, flexibility built into the idea of “defending 
the helpless” or “those who fight you” as will be seen later. 
 In general terms, Fadlallah promotes a stance of resistance towards 
outside forces that provide obstacles to the Muslim world’s self-determination 
and development. The cleric warns of the malignant influences from abroad 
and preaches that, in the Middle East, there is a “situation where the foreign 
powers, the great arrogant states, impose conditions on the people of these 
parts of the world, like placing an iron necklace around their necks in terms of 
economy, politics, knowledge….”
2
 Fadlallah is producing a discourse that 
appeals to the post-colonized, marginalized people of the world while providing 
jihad as a legitimate and justified form of action against an unfavorable 
situation. In theory, the idea of resistance makes sense, but what form should 
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the resistance take? Under which circumstances does jihad constitute 
armed resistance as opposed to civil disobedience?  
 In a recent essay, political sociologist Rola el-Husseini describes the 
limits and uses of various forms of jihad as defined by Fadlallah and his fellow 
cleric, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. She quotes Shams al-Din’s writing 
concerning the versatility and focus of violent resistance: “Armed political 
violence, violent political discourse and violent behavior vis-à-vis a foreign 
invader or occupier is not simple political violence. Its legitimate defensive 
jihad…. It is also a duty for the entire nation… Whether this jihad takes the form 
of a regular war or that of a public or secret resistance or guerrilla warfare does 
not impinge on its legitimacy.”
3
 El-Husseini describes Shams al-Din’s take on 
resistance as a violent struggle against an imposing force. She goes on to deem 
his preaching to be a nationalistic discussion steeped in the language of Islam.  
This explanation describes the logic behind jihad, but in practice the 
resistance can take two forms. The first is a struggle against an occupier, which 
is known as a “defensive jihad.” This is a violent resistance that manifests in 
skirmishes between two armed factions or the destructive martyrdom 
operations of suicide bombers. This side of resistance is often what Westerners 
perceive as jihad, or a holy war. The other form of resistance is a more passive 
endeavor known as sumud—or steadfastness. It might literally mean to occupy 
and hold a portion of land that had been previously liberated by the defensive 
jihad, but it also can refer to sit-ins, protest, boycotts and other forms civil 
disobedience.
4
 As the concept of resistance is fleshed out, it becomes clear that 
it has the possibility be employed in many contexts to great effect. As motives 
and opponents for a resistance movement may change over time, the focus 
and form that the resistance takes may too transform, allowing jihad to remain 
as a constant call to action and legitimizing mechanism.  
The Iranian revolution of 1979 introduced a world of new possibilities 
to resistance groups in the Middle East. The lesson gleaned from the rise of 
Ayatollah Khomeini was that the Islamist paradigm could work in the face 
authoritarian regimes and imperialist powers. Hezbollah itself was forged in 
response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon of 1982. The movement 
began as an armed resistance group formed to drive the Israeli presence from 
their country and to provide support to the displaced and affected Shiites of 
South Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah offered jobs, food, 
medicine and other services to the marginalized Shiite population, who had 
been dislodged from their homes and forced to live in the slums of Beirut. By 
providing needed services where the Lebanese government had fallen short, 
Hezbollah gained the loyalty of the Shiite masses. According to Martin Kramer, 
“Hizbullah’s strength resided in its ability to harness a hundred grievances to 
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one sublime purpose and to persuade its downtrodden adherents of their 
own hidden strength….”
5
 Increasingly, it became clear that Hezbollah would 
only see its goals of an Islamic state realized through resistance to Israeli 
occupation.  
In February of 1985, the group released a formal statement that 
explained that the world is divided between the oppressed and the oppressors. 
The United States was labeled the main oppressive actor because of its use of 
Israel to bring suffering upon Lebanese Muslims. It goes without saying that 
because of Israel’s encroachment upon Lebanese land, what came to be known 
as “the Zionist state,” served as the primary outlet for continued, violent 
resistance by Hezbollah. Clandestine military operations like car bombs and 
suicide bombings against Israeli military installments as well as political targets 
like the U.S. embassy in Lebanon became classified as terrorist activity by much 
of the Western media. Conversely, many Lebanese viewed this violence as 
defensive and warranted. The words of Fadlallah attempt to classify defensive 
jihad as a perfectly viable approach, when used last a resort. He considers “the 
call to jihad to be a call to protect the basic issues affecting human destiny from 
those who are committing aggression against us. If someone fires a rocket at 
me, I cannot respond by offering him a rose. From an Islamic perspective, we 
compare violence to surgery: One only turns to it as a last resort.”
6
  It can be 
taken from this quote that Hezbollah’s jihad is not about compromise; it is 
about taking back what was taken away, by any means necessary.  
This philosophy has produced a long series of violence between Israeli 
forces and Hezbollah over the years. Between 1992 and 2000, the war of 
attrition in Southern Lebanon embodied many examples of defensive jihad, 
including suicide bombings of Israeli military installments in occupied Lebanon. 
One specific string of tit-for-tat violence between the two countries began in 
1996 when Hezbollah launched waves of rockets at northern Israel in response 
to the deaths of Lebanese civilians. Israel’s next move was a counter-attack—
Operation Grapes of Wrath. What ultimately came from this was the Qana 
massacre, in which, Israeli forces in the South of Lebanon slaughtered 
Palestinian refugees. This event galvanized a more unified oppositional stance 
towards Israel among Lebanese Muslims as well as Christians.
7
  
In this instance, as will be shown in others, the back and forth 
between Lebanese resistance and Israeli aggression and vice-versa worked 
favorably into Hezbollah’s discourse surrounding resistance. Any violent 
aggression perpetrated upon the Israelis occupying Lebanon was seen a 
contribution to the cause of Islam and to the defense of the oppressed. At the 
same time, violence towards the Lebanese or Palestinians by Israelis simply 
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created more venerated martyrs and fueled the fires of resistance. 
Ultimately, both increased the support of Hezbollah and further demonized 
Israel in the eyes of the Lebanese. Thus, there appears what I will call a cycle of 
resistance, where opposition to Israeli domination, even when it results in 
deaths on of the resistance side, can be used constructively to encourage unity 
and fervor among the “oppressed.” In addition, any individuals killed become 
“blessed martyrs” and symbols of further resistance. Hezbollah continues to 
use this strategy in their rhetoric.  
In 2008, a car explosion in Damascus resulted in the death of a 
Hezbollah operative named Imad Mughniyah. Hezbollah’s authorities identified 
the operative as a leader in the resistance against the Israeli occupation forces 
in South Lebanon. After establishing this, the representative of Hezbollah made 
a call for Lebanese national unity in the face of “Lebanon’s main enemy, 
represented by Israel, which is accused of carrying out this treacherous 
operation.”
8
 The death of Mughniyah was divisively used as an opportunity to 
demonize Israel. In addition, Islamist authorities rallied around the 
assassination, by extolling Mughniyah’s ‘“jihad’ and ‘sacrifices’ and [by] calling 
on Hezbollah’s leadership ‘to respond to this treacherous operation by dealing 
a painful blow to the Zionist entity.’”
9
 Fadlallah himself commented on the 
assassination and capitalized on this opportunity to publicize the cause of 
resistance in the wake of the tragedy saying, “we look forward to seeing all 
arenas of resistance against the occupation more determined to confront the 
enemy, more solid in the faces of challenges, and more committed to the 
Islamic jihad line that seeks to move the nation from the stage of defeats to the 
stage of victories.”
10
 The statements surrounding the death of Imad Mughniyah 
illustrated that Hezbollah’s clever use of the cycle of resistance continues to be 
profitable in terms of gaining support for the party and for condemning Israel. 
 Even in the group’s early history, Hezbollah was a dynamic entity. 
Armed resistance went hand-in-hand with civil service and the dire situation in 
Lebanon provided many chances for Hezbollah to reach out to the community. 
Focused mostly in the affected South of Lebanon and Beirut area, the 
movement built orphanages that provided refuge to about two thousand 
children. In addition, schools were built to cater to the displaced Shiite 
community, including schools for the blind and deaf. Hezbollah constructed 
cultural centers and hospitals which all created reliance and trust towards 
Hezbollah and its discourse of oppressed and oppressors. This community 
reliance, coupled with Hezbollah’s military successes made Lebanese politics 
the next goal for the resistance group. In a 1995 interview, when asked about 
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the group’s future in the political arena or the possibility of participation in 
the Lebanese parliament, cleric Fadlallah said the following: 
 
“[Hezbollah] has amassed expertise in military, security, 
cultural and political affairs, which greatly enhances its 
chances of spreading its influence in Lebanon, despite the 
challenge from the international American-Israeli campaign 
against it. It would be very difficult to terminate the role of 
Hizballah, because that role has strong grass-roots support 
and is furthermore well grounded in its structure, 
methodology, thought and political activities.”
11
 
 
Since this statement, Hezbollah has participated in all the country’s legislative 
and municipal elections. The party won 14 seats in the national legislature in 
the 2005 elections. Thanks to strategic alliances with other parties, Hezbollah 
gained a reasonably sized voting block of 35 parliamentarians and, for the first 
time, a seat in the cabinet. This newfound political influence did no hinder the 
party’s underlying discourse of resistance. The transition to politics was always 
perceived as being bourn out of the resistance as well as being an act 
resistance in itself. Even in 1985, in the early stages of the movement, long 
before any political involvement to speak of, Fadlallah said, “the spirit driving 
the resistance is beginning to intensify and grow from being simply a combat 
state of mind into a political and ideological state of mind.”
12
 The concept of 
resistance as a driving ideology continued to gain Hezbollah support while 
defining the statements and actions of the party.  
 Today, Hezbollah remains armed because of its refusal to comply with 
the UN’s orders for disarmament. Hezbollah is not content with simply filling a 
political role and wishes to keep resistance against Israel a reality. By defying 
the wishes of the UN (an act of resistance in itself), Hezbollah hopes to remain 
Lebanon’s vanguard against foreign invasion and imperialist pressure. When 
pressed about Hezbollah’s continued armament, party leader Hassan Nasrallah 
clarified, “Resistance is a reaction against aggression. When the aggression 
ends, resistance ends.”
13
 As long as Hezbollah perceives Lebanon as a victim of 
foreign interference, it will remain a beacon of resistance.  
 As Hezbollah gains more influence in Lebanon’s parliament, the 
importance of resistance has only grown. Approaching the elections in 2009, 
speaker Nabih Berri said, “Resistance, liberation and development will be the 
choice of the Lebanese towards a better country and better life.” Although 
liberation and development have been added to the agenda, resistance is still 
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first on the list. He went on to explain, “The choice of resistance is a vital 
national necessity as Israel continues to occupy a part of our land and to violate 
Lebanon’s airspace, boarder and territorial waters.”
14
 Despite Hezbollah’s 
drastically evolving role over the past 30 years, the primacy of resistance has 
remained a key aspect in the party’s speech and philosophy. 
 
                                                 
 
14
 Lebanese Speaker Birri announces Hezbollah-Amal election lists. 
